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In the 1990s, we have witnessed a political movement
toward smaller government and reduced federal funding for
social benefits programs.' At the same time, evidence suggests
that the unemployment insurance (UI) system as it works
today still may not benefit all of its intended recipients.2 The
need for improved UI services and the scarcity of resources
available to meet this need create a tension between political
pressures and considerations of fairness and due process.
While constitutional considerations always override political
pressures, the real issue is where to strike the appropriate
balance between fundamental fairness and economic reality.
I. LEGAL BOUNDARIES
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, the State may not deprive an individual
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In any
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform,
Volume 29, 1996. B.S. 1989, Oklahoma State University; J.D. 1996, University of
Michigan Law School.
** Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume
29, 1996. A.B. 1993, University of Michigan; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan Law
School.
1. See, e.g., Janet Hook, House GOP Begins Drive to Slash Social Spending, L.A.
TIMES, July 28, 1995, at Al; Barbara Vobejda, GOP Outlines Broad Welfare Reform,
WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1995, at Al.
2. E.g., WALTER CORSON & WALTER NICHOLSON, AN EXAMINATION OF DECLINING
UI CLAIMS DURING THE 1980S 1 (1988); Maurice Emsellem & Monica Halas, Repre-
sentation of Claimants at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings: Identifying
Models and Proposed Solutions, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 289 (1996); Mary K. Gillespie
& Cynthia G. Schneider, Are Non-English-Speaking Claimants Served by Unemploy-
ment Compensation Programs? The Need for Bilingual Services, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
333 (1996).
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due process analysis, a court must determine first whether
life, liberty, or property is at stake and, if so, what measures
should be taken to provide due process protections for the
interest in question.3
Whereas the Constitution may set the foundations of proce-
dural due process in UI adjudication, the federal statutory
scheme draws the basic blueprints around which the structure
shall be built. The procedural specifications in the master
plan, as it currently reads, are rather loose. The Social Securi-
ty Act requires only that a state's UI scheme be "reasonably
calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensa-
tion when due"4 and that the state provide an "[olpportunity
for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all individ-
uals whose claims for unemployment compensation are
denied."5
Some might argue that, in fact, the specifications are so
vague as not to provide a coherent plan at all. What, after all,
is a "fair hearing"? What is a scheme that is "reasonably
calculated" to provide full payment of unemployment compen-
sation "when due"? Absent any other explicit requirement,
these questions fall back on the traditional inquiries estab-
lished by Goldberg v. Kelly 6 and by the Mathews v. Eldridge7
balancing test, with state law filling in the contours.8 States
decide what procedural safeguards to provide, what kind of
hearing to hold, and what method of adjudication to apply. As
long as their programs meet basic requirements of due pro-
cess, the United States Secretary of Labor certifies the plan
for payment of federal funds.9
3. KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 9.3 (3d ed. 1994).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1994).
5. Id. § 503(a)(3).
6. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
7. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1318 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that the
constitutional standard of due process and the requirements of the fair hearing
provision of 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) are "co-extensive"), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980);
Camacho v. Bowling, 562 F. Supp. 1012, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("Thus, if the court
finds that the appeals process violates procedural due process, it follows that the
appeals process also violates Section 503(a)(3)."). '
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 503(a). Note that the state's law also must comply with addi-
tional requirements in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311
(1994), as discussed elsewhere in this Symposium. See, e.g., Maribeth Wilt-Seibert,
Unemployment Compensation for Employees of Educational Institutions: How State
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II. WHAT PROCESS Is DUE?
Although it has not always been the case,' since 1970, the
Supreme Court has established that many statutory welfare
benefits, including unemployment compensation, are property
rights protected by the Due Process Clause." Since that time,
the central debate has focused on the issue of how much
process is due.'2
Any procedural reforms to unemployment insurance admin-
istration must aspire to create a system that is efficient, fair,
and satisfying to the parties involved. In deciding which
procedures to implement, policymakers may choose between
taking a categorical approach, which sets a blanket of proce-
dures in all claims, and taking a balancing approach, which
weighs the costs and benefits of requiring particular proce-
dures.
Courts Have Created Variations on Federally Mandated Statutory Language, 29 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 585, 587-89 (1996).
A state's program also must fulfill another due process requirement: to provide
timely determination of appeals "with the greatest promptness that is administra-
tively feasible." 20 C.F.R. § 650.3 (1995). The United States Department of Labor has
established timeliness guidelines regarding how rapidly first-level appeals should be
decided, but has set no such standards for second-level appeals. Id. § 650.4. One
court held that nothing in the statutes or legislative history requires the Secretary
to promulgate more explicit standards. Wilkinson v. Abrams, 627 F.2d 650, 661-62
(3d Cir. 1980). Should the standard for second-level appeals be made more explicit
than merely to require administrative feasibility, or should that determination be left
to the states? For a discussion of this issue, see Sharon M. Dietrich & Cynthia L.
Rice, Timeliness in the Unemployment Compensation Appeals Process: The Need for
Increased Federal Oversight, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 235, 264-66 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785-86
(1964) (arguing that government benefits should be rights to be afforded procedural
protections).
11. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (rejecting the traditional
distinction between protected rights and unprotected privileges and holding that at
least some statutory entitlements are within the scope of due process protections).
12. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267
(1975); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986); Edward L. Rubin, Due
Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1044 (1984); Comment, Due
Process and the Independent Medical Examiner System in the Maine Workers'
Compensation Act, 45 ME. L. REV. 123 (1993); Note, Specifying the Procedures Re-
quired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1510 (1975).
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A. Categorical Approaches
A categorical approach to setting appropriate procedures
would be rather simple to implement. Policymakers merely
would have to impose a set of procedures which people com-
monly agree tend to result in fair hearings and then apply
them to all cases. Although there has been no real agreement
as to what procedures would be appropriate, it is instructive
here to list some of the ingredients of due process. Judge
Friendly has delineated some of the possible elements of
judicial due process:
1. An unbiased tribunal
2. Notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted
for it
3. An opportunity to present reasons why the proposed
action should not be taken
4. The right to present evidence, including the right to call
witnesses
5. The right to know and cross-examine adverse evidence
6. The right to have a decision based only on the evidence
presented
7. The right to counsel
8. A requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the
proceeding
9. A requirement that the tribunal prepare a written
statement of reasons for the decision
13
Judge Friendly recognized that the nature and seriousness of
the government action would determine the necessity of the
listed factors. 14 In some cases, the administrative costs would
13. Friendly, supra note 12, at 1279-92.
14. Id. at 1278-79. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970), recognized that a pretermination hearing was required before stopping
social security payments but that it "need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-
judicial trial.' Id. at 266. The Court required only the following pretermination
safeguards: an impartial decisionmaker, a right to present argument orally, a right
to present evidence orally, a right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
a right to be accompanied by counsel, a decision based solely on the evidence adduced
at the hearing, and a statement by the decisionmaker of the reasons for decision and
of the hearing evidence relied on. Id. at 267-71. Necessary safeguards at a post-
deprivation hearing would be different. Id. at 261.
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be an intolerable burden on resources that might have been
earmarked for unemployment compensation payments, and
the program would be better off with less cumbersome yet still
fair procedures.15 This is only an examination of rudimentary
due process requirements. Policymakers may impose greater
safeguards if they still perceive unfairness and inaccuracies in
the current system.
B. Balancing Approaches
Rather than using a categorical approach, the Supreme
Court generally has applied a balancing test in determining
which procedural protections are necessary to provide suffi-
cient due process with regard to withholding government
benefits. In Goldberg v. Kelly, i" the Court recognized that the
extent of procedural due process that must be afforded is
"influenced by the extent to which [the recipient] may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss'. . . and depends upon
whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss out-
weighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication."7
Likewise, the Court made explicit the elements of the balanc-
ing approach in Mathews v. Eldridge:i
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute pro-
cedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail. 9
15. See Friendly, supra note 12, at 1303-04.
16. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
17. Id. at 263 (citations omitted). The Court held that, before welfare benefits
could be terminated, a recipient is entitled to a hearing that includes characteristics
found in a judicial trial. Id. at 267-71.
18. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
19. Id. at 335. The Court limited Goldberg to the particular facts of that case
and held that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to the termination of
disability benefits. Id. at 349.
Procedural Reform
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III. APPLYING THE MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE BALANCING TEST
TO THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM
A. Whose Interests Are Affected?
The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test still applies when
examining the adequacy of a given administrative procedure
20
and is, therefore, the appropriate starting point for analyzing
new procedural proposals. The first consideration focuses on
the private interest that will be affected by official action.2'
The UI system was designed to provide for the payment of
insurance benefits to persons who, through no fault of their
own, have become unemployed.22 The system seeks to achieve
two main purposes: to prevent these employees from becoming
dependent on the welfare system during their search for new
jobs and to provide enough temporary income to permit the
employees to look for the best possible job opportunities.23
Unemployment insurance benefit payments begin after an
initial determination of eligibility by an interviewer who
considers information submitted by the claimant, the claim-
ant's former employer, and others.24 Because the taxes that an
employer must pay into the state's UI fund are indexed to the
employer's experience rating,25 an employer has a substantial
20. See id. at 335.
21. Id.
22. See Patricia S. Wall, A Survey of Unemployment Security Law: Determining
Unemployment Compensation Benefits, 42 LAB. L.J. 179 (1991). Many explanations,
such as tight eligibility requirements, are offered for the fact that UI covers very few
of those who are unemployed. Id. at 179. But Gillespie and Schneider assert that
many claimants, especially in areas with high concentrations of non-English-speak-
ing persons, may not receive UI benefits because of their inability to comprehend the
complexities of the system. Gillespie & Schneider, supra note 2, at 338-42. In fact,
according to 1983 statistics, most UT recipients "are disproportionately higher
income, prime-aged white males who hold full-time jobs." Stewart J. Schwab, The
Diversity of Contingent Workers and the Need for Nuanced Policy, 52 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 915, 927 (1995).
23. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 13-14 (1935), reprinted
in 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION: THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
SECURITY OF 1935, at 33-34 (National Conference on Social Welfare ed., 1985);
Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Ronald L. Oaxaca, Unemployment Insurance, Duration of
Unemployment, and Subsequent Wage Gain, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 754, 754 (1976).
24. See Wall, supra note 22, at 179.
25. Experience rating is a system designed to force employers to internalize the
costs to the UT system that they create. The general idea is that employers who fire
or layoff the most employees should be required to contribute the greatest amount
of funds to the UI system. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 88 (1994).
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incentive to challenge claims for unemployment insurance.
Thus, the eligibility determination process often involves em-
ployers and employees presenting conflicting evidence about
the circumstances of the employee's termination from her
employment.
B. Risk of Error and Value of Other Safeguards
The second factor in the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test
is the risk of erroneous deprivation of a valid UI claim
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.26 This issue
goes to a more general concern for institutional accuracy.
1. Telephone Hearings-One of the ways in which the UI
systems in some states have responded to growing caseloads
and reduced funding is by conducting telephone hearings.7
Although initially used mainly in cases where claimants or
their employers could not readily attend oral hearings, tele-
phone hearings increasingly are used as a way to expedite
claims processing.28 In their Symposium Article, Due Process
Implications of Telephone Hearings, Allan A. Toubman,
Linda Rogers-Tomer, and Tim McArdle suggest that conduct-
ing telephone hearings results in reduced rates of claimant
representation, non-party witness introduction, document
production, and cross-examination. 29 The greater concern,
however, is that telephone hearings result in lower claimant
success rates, suggesting that the use of telephone hearings
leads to erroneous results.3" Many of the participants in the
Symposium questioned the statistical methods used in the
study and felt that more research needed to be done before
the effect of telephone hearings could be evaluated con-
clusively. 3' Additionally, some participants suggested that
26. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
27. Allan A. Toubman et al., Due Process Implications of Telephone Hearings:
The Case for an Individualized Approach to Scheduling Telephone Hearings, 29 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 407, 414 (1996).
28. See id.
29. Id. at 449-54.
30. Id. at 449, 452.
31. Audience Member, Remarks at Unemployment Compensation: Continuity
and Change Symposium Presented by the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation and the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 312, 314-15
(Mar. 31, 1995) (transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) [hereinafter Symposium Transcript].
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reduced success rates for claimants did not necessarily indi-
cate that telephone hearings were leading to erroneous
results.3 2 Although telephone hearings may provide a means
of reaching greater numbers of claimants, both economic and
fairness costs need to be evaluated to determine whether
further procedural protections should be implemented.
2. Representation and Claimant Access-The most serious
indictment of the UI system suggests that claimants are
denied effective access to the process. In their Symposium
Article, Representation of Claimants at Unemployment Com-
pensation Proceedings: Identifying Models and Proposed Solu-
tions, Maurice Emsellem and Monica Halas suggest that
many claimants do not understand the UI system.33 The
authors assert that increasing the availability of claimant
representation would help to equalize the disadvantages that
claimants face as they challenge evidence presented by more
highly educated and better-funded employers who are usually
represented by counsel. 4 Presumably, representation by
counsel will aid a participant in any legal proceeding;35
however, it is less clear that the lack of counsel leads to a
greater percentage of erroneous results. Indeed, evidence of
greater claimant success when represented by counsel may
not necessarily indicate that the system is working better.36
Although the increased use of counsel may not necessarily
lead to better results, if the representation could be provided
at little to no cost to the UI system, states should encourage
the use of counsel. At the Symposium, Halas contended that
their findings indicate that Administrative Law Judges (ALJs)
may appreciate the reduced burden of having cases presented
by able counsel who are familiar with the system.3 7
In a related Symposium Article, Are Non-English-Speaking
Claimants Served by Unemployment Compensation Programs?
The Need for Bilingual Services, Mary K. Gillespie and
Cynthia G. Schneider discuss the problems faced by claimants
with limited-English-speaking capacity.38 Unlike claimants
32. Id. at 314.
33. See Emsellem & Halas, supra note 2, at 297-98.
34. Id. at 294-97.
35. Id. at 292.
36. James L. Pflasterer, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 370-72. "[A]
lawyer's more likely to not go forward with an employee's case if it doesn't have
merit. . . ." Id. at 371-72.
37. Monica Halas, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 335-36.
38. Gillespie & Schneider, supra note 2.
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
who may be somewhat disadvantaged by a lack of legal
representation, claimants who do not speak English may be
completely denied access to the system in geographic areas
with inadequate bilingual services.3 9 Gillespie and Schneider
propose that local UI offices in areas with a high percentage
of limited English-speaking residents offer bilingual services,
including bilingual staff, bilingual forms, and interpreters at
hearings.4" Perhaps more than any of the other issues pre-
sented in this section of the Symposium, the problem of
bilingual services highlights the difficult balance between
fairness and economic concerns. Clearly, a hearing cannot be
fair if a claimant cannot read the notice, does not under-
stand the proceedings, or is unable effectively to articulate
her claim. Equally evident is the enormous cost of providing
comprehensive bilingual services.
Symposium participants were generally sympathetic to
these problems, but they were concerned that the statistics
showing reduced eligibility rates for non-English-speaking
claimants could have many explanations.4' There was much
support, especially from an economic perspective, for the
inclusion of "tag lines" on official forms mailed out to claim-
ants; however, the use of comprehensive bilingual services
was generally seen as too costly.
42
3. Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Processes-Many of the
calls for expanded procedural safeguards assume an ad-
versarial proceeding. In Torquemada and Unemployment
Compensation Appeals, William W. Milligan approaches the
question from the opposite view that unemployment compen-
sation hearings are inquisitorial in nature.43 He contrasts
high-volume unemployment compensation hearings with
hearings by administrative agencies that have low-volume
caseloads, noting that these other agencies conduct proceed-
ings which may be characterized as more adversarial.44
39. Id. at 333-34.
40. Id. at 379-86.
41. James L. Pflasterer, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 365.
42. Id. at 367; Neal Young, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 378. Tag
lines warn, in several different languages, that the document received is important
and that the recipients should make sure that they understand its contents. See
Gillespie & Schneider, supra note 2, at 347.
43. William W. Milligan, Essay: Torquemada and Unemployment Compensation
Appeals, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 389, 392-93 (1996).
44. Id. at 394. Robert L. Harvey, Chairman of the California Unemployment
Insurance Appeals Board, also noted: "[W]hy are we expected to do in forty-five
Procedural Reform 225
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Milligan concludes that we should recognize the unique na-
ture of the unemployment compensation adjudicatory format
and frame reforms accordingly, rather than provide proce-
dures that may not be tailored to an inquisitorial forum.45
The essential question in deciding whether to use an in-
quisitorial or an adversarial approach to UI hearings revolves
around who should control the proceedings and the evidence
-the parties or the AL. 4  If a reform proposes a procedure
geared toward a more adversarial resolution, the Mathews v.
Eldridge test would first examine the risk that an ALJ acting
under an inquisitorial regime will decide a case erroneously
and then would compare the benefit of a more adversarial
approach that removes control over the proceedings from the
ALJ to the parties.47
A possible method of determining ALJ accuracy would be to
examine reversal rates. It is important to note, however, that
aggregated reversal rates do not in themselves show accura-
cy.48 Furthermore, a reversal of an ALJ determination does
not mean that the determination was incorrect. Indeed, cases
before an ALJ are more likely to involve highly subjective
matters, such as voluntary quits for good cause and willful
misconduct, rather than more objective matters, such as
minutes what most other adjudication forums allocate days or weeks [to do]?" Robert
L. Harvey, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 306-07. Harvey suggested that
although the current procedural system sacrifices quality for volume, it "provid[es]
amazing quality and ... [is] probably the best adjudicating bargain in the world." Id.
at 310.
45. See Milligan, supra note 43, at 405.
46. We will refer to the actor who reviews the decisions of the initial claims
officer as an Administrative Law Judge, while acknowledging that many states
entitle them "referee" or "hearing officer."
47. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that the balanc-
ing test examines the erroneous deprivation of a private interest through procedures
used only after first examining the private interest affected by the official action).
48. For example, the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review reversed approximately 18% of the claims brought before it in 1995. Memo-
randum from Clifford F. Blaze, Deputy Chief Counsel, Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, to Jesse S. Reyes,
Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 2 (Jan. 31, 1996)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Blaze
Memorandum]. This does not necessarily mean that 18% of the Referee decisions
were erroneous, but only that, of the determinations taken to appeal before the
Board, only 18% were decided differently on the same facts. In fact, claimants and
employers appealed only 22% of Referee decisions. Id. Supposing that the other 78%,
who did not appeal, correctly self-dismissed their cases as lacking merit-but
recognizing that this supposition may not be entirely correct-then Referees decided
"incorrectly" in only approximately 4% of their determinations.
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monetary eligibility, which are weeded out at the initial
claims office determination. Thus, because the ALJ must
make a yes-or-no decision on issues that could lie anywhere
on a spectrum, 49 accuracy as a criterion is not available in the
objective sense. A proxy for an ALJ's accuracy would be to
compare ALJ decisions for consistency.5 °
As for moving evidentiary control from the ALJ to the
parties, an objection to the current judge-centered approach is
that the ALJ may not be able to maintain impartiality. When
the AL must elicit all of the evidence, he is forced to wear
three hats, that of impartial judge, advocate for the claimant,
and advocate for the former employer. Likewise, if a claimant
is unrepresented by counsel, the ALJ must aid the claimant in
presenting her case because the ALJ has a duty to develop all
of the relevant facts.5 '
C. Government's Interest
The third factor of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test
is the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional or
substituted procedural requirements.52 Although cost alone
should not be dispositive of this issue,53 the query must inevi-
tably consider the scarcity of fiscal and administrative re-
sources.
49. DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 3, § 9.10. "The A.J can hope to do little more
than draw a line on the... spectrum and use her judgment to determine on which
side of the line individual cases fall." Id.
50. Id. To evaluate consistency, we would need to examine how widely disparate
the individual AI's reversal rates are from the mean reversal rate. See id. Thus, if
the mean reversal rate is 50%, the goal should be for individual ALJs to maintain
reversal rates between 40% and 60%. Id.
51. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoret-
ical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in
the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 787 (1974). The
Supreme Court has rejected the multiple-hats challenge to AJ inquisitorial
adjudication. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
52. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
53. Id.
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The use of telephone hearings seems to be a direct response
to the administrative burden of conducting in-person hear-
ings. As a matter of conserving administrative resources,
however, no evidence was presented at the Symposium to
determine whether the cost of teleconferencing is less than
the cost of "live" hearings.
Likewise, the increased use of legal representation, as long
as it is not provided by the government, could lead to tremen-
dous savings to the UI system by reducing the number of
meritless appeals and by streamlining procedural aspects of
the hearings. Requiring the government to provide legal
representation to claimants, however, would not be a likely
alternative and would impose tremendous costs on the sys-
tem.54
Increasing the availability of bilingual services would im-
pose similar costs on the UI system; however, the complete
barrier to access for non-English-speaking claimants presents
a far more disturbing challenge to the fairness of the UI pro-
cess. Although government-provided interpreters and bilin-
gual staff may prove to be economically infeasible, the use of
tag lines and bilingual forms appears to be a reasonable and
inexpensive alternative to address the problem of claimant
access.
IV. TIMELINESS AND TRADE-OFFS
Unemployment insurance adjudication is a high-volume
undertaking, requiring a case management approach that is
different from a fully adversarial process."5 Because of the
pressures involved in the mass administration of justice, the
system is in perpetual danger of falling behind in claims
processing. In Timeliness in the Unemployment Compensation
Appeals Process: The Need for Increased Federal Oversight,
Sharon M. Dietrich and Cynthia L. Rice call attention to this
latest "crisis" in appeals processing which arose out of the
recessionary period of 1989 to 1993.56 One of the discussants
at the Symposium suggested, however, that this problem has
54. Mashaw, supra note 51, at 789.
55. See id. at 787-88.
56. Dietrich & Rice, supra note 9, at 237, 242-47.
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always existed." Perhaps the timeliness issue has only re-
cently become salient because of the political trend towards
reducing the size of government. 5' At any rate, the partici-
pants at the Symposium agreed that achieving timeliness in
appeals processing is currently a permanent problem, but
disagreed as to the appropriate solution. 9
Timeliness, of course, is an essential element of procedural
due process. Without a timely determination of the claim, the
state effectively deprives the UI claimant, who appeals a
denial at the initial determination level or a reversal of bene-
fits at the ALJ level, of a statutorily defined property right.6"
The claimant's interests in timely benefits payments are
grave and cannot be remedied completely by payment at a
later time.
On the other side of the balance is the government's inter-
est in tolerating delayed payments. Arguably, erroneous
determinations in favor of claimants cause an unfair charge
against a state's UI trust fund. The Supreme Court in Cali-
fornia Department of Human Resources Development v. Java,6
however, suggested that the state could recover these errone-
ous payments by offsets against future claims for benefits or
by civil action. 2 The inquiry implicates the main government
interests of the cost and feasibility of administration. Unem-
ployment insurance programs are being squeezed by cutbacks
in funding, leading to the eternal debate of quantity versus
quality. 3 Participants at the Symposium suggested that
states currently use certain unnecessary procedures and
practices that could be eliminated without sacrificing quali-
ty.
64
57. Melvin J. Bright, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 451 ("The prob-
lems of appeals promptness have been around since.., sometime shortly after 1935.
I suspect, to the extent that I'm able to predict the future, they'll still be here some-
time around 2035.").
58. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Melvin J. Bright, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 453
(noting the lack of a model that improves upon the UI system); Edward J.
Schoenbaum, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 457 (describing an ABA
proposal for judicial timeliness that would probably be unacceptable in the UI con-
text); Audience Member, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 472-73 (arguing
contrary to Dietrich and Rice and in favor of less federal control).
60. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341-42 (1976).
61. 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
62. Id. at 129 n.8 (1971).
63. See supra note 44.
64. For example, Edward J. Schoenbaum, President of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judges, suggested that case docketing practices could be improved
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The crucial question in the balance is "what is the risk of
erroneous deprivation?" Whether the delay really deprives
claimants of a legitimate property right depends upon wheth-
er the initial determinations are accurate. Before a state
employment security agency makes a determination as to
eligibility, two groups comprise the universe of claimants:
those who a priori are entitled to benefits and those who a
priori are not. 5
After the initial determination, there are four groups of
claimants: (1) those who have been granted benefits properly;
(2) those who have been granted benefits improperly; (3) those
who have been denied benefits improperly; and (4) those who
have been denied benefits properly. Claimants in Groups (1)
and (4) are, of course, not harmed by delay in appeals deter-
minations. Claimants in Group (3) are false negatives. These
are the claimants who must go through the hardships of
unemployment and the difficulties of finding re-employment
without the temporary aid of UI insurance while their claims
are pending. It is not obvious that delay harms claimants in
Group (2). They are the false positives. Arguably, claimants in
Group (2) are not harmed, because they receive a benefit to
which they are not entitled. Yet receiving undeserved benefits
still harms them if they alter their behavior in reasonable
reliance upon receiving the replacement income and later
must pay it back.6
As a programmatic matter, should we be more concerned
with the false positives or with the false negatives?" Perhaps
the UI program should be more concerned with the false
negatives than the false positives, because erroneous denial of
benefits creates a harm that cannot be completely remedied ex
by tightening requirements before ALJs may grant continuances in cases rather than
allowing cases to remain on continuance for an indeterminate time. Edward J.
Schoenbaum, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 467-68. Schoenbaum also sug-
gested dispensing with the practice of transcribing tapes of the hearings because the
reviewing board could always listen to the tapes instead. Id. at 469.
65. Cf JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 84 (1983) (comparing the
social costs of misidentifying whether a social security claimant "really" meets the
statutory standards).
66. For example, while receiving these payments, a claimant might be induced
to remain out of the workplace longer in order to find more suitable work. This
worker might be worse off when the state garnishes this unforeseen debt from his
wages, whereas, had he known that this "income" was not really available to him, he
would have been more likely to take a job immediately without incurring this debt.
67. Cf MASHAW, supra note 65, at 84-85 (noting that attempts to eliminate one
type of error will lead to more of the opposite type of error).
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post."8 Although these claimants ultimately receive the statu-
torily defined benefits, they have had to endure the hardships
of unemployment without contemporaneous assistance, a pain
for which they are not compensated. 9 Setting priority to
claimants' appeals may also be justified on risk distribution
principles. Individuals are less able to absorb the risk of loss
than are larger employers or socialized risk-spreading institu-
tions such as the UI system.7 °
CONCLUSION
Shrinking budgets force hard choices of resource allocation
and trade-offs between efficiency, fairness, and timeliness.
The reforms that should be implemented depend upon the
policymaker's view of the proper nature of the UI proceed-
ing-adversarial or inquisitorial-and of where the inaccura-
cies or errors in the system lie. If the inaccuracies lie earlier
in the process, we should target more resources to that stage
in order to reduce the number of appeals that burden the
system.7 '
68. But cf id. at 85 (concluding that neither error is more costly in determina-
tions of disability benefits).
69. Dietrich and Rice argue that claimants' appeals should be prioritized when
a backlog of appeals has developed that will require some time to resolve. Dietrich
& Rice, supra note 9, at 270. Under our analysis here, however, we note that some
of the claimants who appeal might be in Group (4). Yet this fact does not detract
from the proposal, because claimants in that group will simply find out sooner that
they are not entitled to benefits. Employers who appeal are not harmed by the delay
because their experience ratings are not charged until the determination is final.
There may be a harm to Group (2) claimants, but because the extent to which they
rely upon the UI payments is unknown, we should target our resources at the known
harm of delay, which is the harm to those who are improperly denied benefits.
70. Cf James M. Klein & Thomas E. Willging, Beyond Java: Redistribution of
Risks in the Administration of Unemployment Insurance, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
490, 514-18 (1973) (proposing a presumption of eligibility for claimants who meet
monetary requirements and present nonfrivolous appeals). Klein and Willging
propose that claimants receive payments immediately upon appeal until the state
makes a final determination as to eligibility, on the grounds that "[t]he low-income,
low-asset claimant does not have sufficient reserves to absorb the cost of delay." Id.
at 500. Although the claimant appeal docketing priority proposal would not go as far
as the Klein and Willging suggestion, the same principle of risk allocation applies.
71. See, e.g., id. at 519 (proposing a reallocation of resources toward the initial
determinations in order to improve accuracy at the earliest point in time). If a state
targets resources earlier in the process, fewer appeals would burden the system
downstream. Naturally, this also raises the issue of cost-effectiveness. Claims
examiners at the initial determination level in Pennsylvania made over one million
determinations in 1995. Referees decided approximately 54,000 appeals, while the
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The proposed reforms of providing legal representation to
claimants,7 2 providing bilingual services for non-English-
speaking claimants,7 3 or limiting the use of telephonic hear-
ings74 all come at a cost of reducing the funding available to
other parts of the system.75 Additionally, providing more
control to parties in presenting their claims-or in defending
against claims-is an adversarial mechanism that tends to
slow the pace of adjudication, 6 thus heightening our concerns
about timely adjudications.77
These proposals purportedly would provide fairer results in
claims determinations where claimants have not been capable
of sufficiently presenting their claims.78 In addition, if there is
at least an atmosphere of fairness, regardless of whether the
determination was accurate, claimants and employers may be
more satisfied with the results. 79 Perhaps participant satisfac-
tion is the unifying goal that resolves the conflicts among
efficiency, fairness, and timeliness. As one Symposium partici-
pant noted, "At the end of the hearing. . . [the parties should]
feel that they have not been precluded from having their day
in court and having some sense of the procedure and a fair-
ness in the whole process." °
The Articles that follow suggest several procedural measures
through which the UI system can be improved to provide
greater protections to its intended beneficiaries. We believe
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review decided approximately 12,000
appeals, of which only 1105 were appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Blaze
Memorandum, supra note 48, at 3-4. Pennsylvania may find cost-effective improve-
ments in the dockets by targeting more resources at the referee level and reducing
the number of appeals downstream, but might not find any improvement by spread-
ing the same resources among one million determinations at the first level.
72. Emsellem & Halas, supra note 2, at 320-31.
73. Gillespie & Schneider, supra note 2, at 379-86.
74. Toubman et al., supra note 27, at 457-58.
75. Cf DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 3, § 9.11 (noting the increased costs of
permitting claimants to cross-examine medical experts who testify in Social Security
Administration hearings and suggesting that the practice adversely affects accuracy).
76. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND
DEFENSE 34-35 (1984).
77. See Dietrich & Rice, supra note 9.
78. See, e.g., LANDSMAN, supra note 76, at 45 (asserting that adversarial process
and effective advocacy serve to protect parties at an initial disadvantage).
79. Willard Z. Carr, a labor relations and employment law attorney who partici-
pated in the Symposium, suggested that the ALJ should humor the parties' desire to
present evidence that could be irrelevant or technically inadmissible, whether or not
the evidence is actually relied upon, to give the parties "the sense that the hearing
officer is really listening to them, really cares about what they are saying." Willard
Z. Carr, Symposium Transcript, supra note 31, at 294.
80. Id. at 295.
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that the suggested reforms will provide future UI policy-
makers with a useful starting point for further study and
discussion.

